Quem já leu as cartas de Warren Buffet aos accionistas da Berkshire deve-se lembrar da carta de 2002. Na altura ele estava a tentar-se livrar dos derivados que estavam no balanço da General Re (tinha tomado posse desta seguradora há relativamente pouco tempo e percebeu o perigo que era ter os derivados no balanço). Fez portanto o que devia fazer vendeu-os com prejuízo enquanto podia e encerrou o negócio dos derivados. O mais curioso é que em vez de ficar calado, publicitou a venda e explicou detalhadamente o problema, só que todos fingiram não ouvir o que ele dizia. Nesta altura deverá haver muita gente a pensar eu lhe deveria ter prestado mais atenção. Não foi por acaso que se tornou um dos homens mais ricos do mundo
“When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn’t want, judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it.”
Aconselho vivamente a ler toda a carta original. Ficam aqui apenas mais dois extractos para o post não ficar muito pesado:
“Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others.
On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems.”
"We try to be alert to any sort of mega-catastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly appreciative about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal."
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf
“When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn’t want, judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it.”
Aconselho vivamente a ler toda a carta original. Ficam aqui apenas mais dois extractos para o post não ficar muito pesado:
“Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others.
On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems.”
"We try to be alert to any sort of mega-catastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly appreciative about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal."
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf
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